Secure Quantum Passwords by Hotta, Masahiro & Ozawa, Masanao
ar
X
iv
:0
80
6.
10
76
v1
  [
qu
an
t-p
h]
  6
 Ju
n 2
00
8
Secure Quantum Passwords
Masahiro Hotta∗ 1 and Masanao Ozawa§ 2
∗ Graduate School of Science, Tohoku University,
Sendai, 980-8578, Japan
§ Graduate School of Information Science, Nagoya University,
Chikusa-ku, Nagoya, 464-8601, Japan
Abstract
We propose a quantum authentication protocol that is robust against
the theft of secret keys. In the protocol, disposable quantum pass-
words prevent impersonation attacks with stolen secret keys. The
protocol also prevents the leakage of secret information of a certifica-
tion agent.
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1 Introduction
Secure authentication plays an important role in modern society, sup-
porting various types of transactions. Recently, there has been a surge in
crimes involving skimming passwords in smart cards. In addition, computer
viruses and criminals have led to authentication systems leaking customer
passwords from certification agents which should be kept secret under normal
circumstances. These issues expose the fragility of classical authentication
methods. Classical authentication is performed essentially by cross-checking
classical secret information composed of alphanumeric characters and shared
by two parties to identify each other. Although improved methods have been
developed which apply biometrics including fingerprints and iris codes, these
cannot stop skimming at a fundamental level. The root of the problem is
that there exists no principle to prohibit the cloning of classical information.
Meanwhile, quantum authentication is a possible way to assure such
safety by employing fundamental physics principles. Under the no-cloning
theorem [1] of quantum information, there exists no physical process to per-
fectly copy quantum states non-orthogonal to each other. Hence, by encoding
secret information into non-orthogonal quantum states, it is possible to pre-
vent perfect skimming. It is also known from the uncertainty principle [2]
that measurements for eavesdropping by an adversary can be detected by
checking the change of quantum states.
Several quantum protocols for identification have been proposed. Those
methods can be classified into two basic classes of method. In the first
method, common secret keys are generated as classical information composed
of alphanumeric characters [3]-[9]. In identification processes, shared classical
information is converted into quantum information and sent from A, who
is a user, to B, who is a certification agent. In the second method [10]–
[12], secret keys are shared as quantum information from the start. For
example, A stores the information in a specific portable device, a quantum
smart card, which is slotted into the quantum authentication machines of
B. Though these quantum protocols have advantages over classical methods,
several unsatisfactory aspects remain. For example, in the first method, clone
leakage of classical secret keys from B cannot be prohibited in principle. For
the second method, impersonation cannot be prohibited when A’s quantum
smart card is stolen.
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In this paper, we propose a quantum protocol in which A can require B
to identify herself under high security, overcoming the above disadvantages
by using Bell states and one-time-pad passwords together. A’s qubits of
shared Bell pairs are stored in a quantum smart card. The password that
A determines is memorized only by A and is not known by B or others.
The advantages of our protocol are the following. (I) Even if A’s quantum
smart card is stolen by an adversary E, E cannot impersonate A without
knowing her password. (II) No available information of the password is
contained in the stolen card. (III) B does not keep any information about
A’s passwords, thereby avoiding the risk of clone-leakage from B’s storage
by E. (IV) E cannot make perfect copies of the passwords by eavesdropping
on quantum channels. Moreover, by hiding quantum-mechanically encoded
passwords behind many decoy qubits when sending to B, a high rate of
eavesdropping detection can be achieved. (V) In identification tests of A by
B, entanglement between qubits of shared Bell pairs and qubits of passwords
is not generated. Therefore, B can use A’s quantum-password qubits once
and then throw them away. Hence, B must resend to A only half of the
qubits of the shared Bell pairs.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, typical protocols of
quantum authentication proposed to date are briefly reviewed. In section 3,
we propose a simplified protocol with quantum passwords by which we will
explain the basic ideas of our full protocol. In section 4, security analysis
is given for the simplified protocol. In section 5, an improved protocol with
high security is proposed by extending the simplified protocol in section 3.
2 Protocols proposed to date
In this section, we characterize authentication by the following. (a) There
exist two parties A and B. (b) The purpose of authentication is that B
identifies A with high success probability. (c) A and B have common secret
keys that may be classical or quantum. (d) Authentication protocol are
composed of the following phases. (d,i) Generation of secret keys. (d,ii) A
and B work upon those secret keys by local operations and individually store
them. (d,iii) In authentication, A and B are able to send their secret keys
and other information using classical and quantum communication. (d,iv)
B can check whether a user communicating with B is a legitimate person,
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that is A, using locally accessible information. If something is wrong with
this check, the process stops. (d,v) After B recognizes A, they are able to
perform local operations and exchange information by classical and quantum
communication. After that, the setup of (d,ii) is reproduced.
If A also wants to identify B, the above protocol applies with exchanged
roles. The protocol is called quantum when it requires quantum informa-
tion and quantum media. In the following, we briefly review some proposed
protocols.
Classical authentication: In (c) above, secret keys can be composed of
bit numbers. In (d,i), A and B meet and share a sequence of numbers. In
(d,ii), they individually store the numbers without revealing them to any
third party. For example, A memorizes the secret key and B stores the key
in an electronic database. In (d,iii), A encodes the memorized information by
classical ciphers and sends it to B. B decodes the information sent from A.
In (d,iv), B compares the decoded result with her sequence of secret numbers.
If the decoded information is consistent with the numbers, B recognizes A.
If not, B stops the process. In this protocol, there is no need for phase (d,v)
because B can discard the information sent from A. It is well known that
this protocol cannot eliminate the danger of undetected leakage by cloning
the classical information.
Barnum 1 : Barnum [10] proposed two quantum protocols. The first
method uses a sequence of qubit pairs in a fixed Bell state as secret keys
of phase (c). In (d,i), A and B each share half of the Bell pairs. In (d,ii),
A stores her qubit pairs in a quantum smart card, while B keeps hers in a
quantum storage device. In (d,iii), A sends the quantum states stored in the
smart card to B through a quantum channel. In (d,iv), B performs a Bell
measurement of the qubits sent from A and the qubits stored in B’s storage
device. From the measurement results, B verifies whether the two qubit
states in the sequence are an original Bell state. In general, entanglement
states such as Bell states exhibit purity properties only when all the entangled
subsystems are gathered. A lack of some entangled subsystems leads to mixed
states. If A is a legitimate person, the two qubits measured by B should be
in a pure Bell state to give an acceptable result. If an adversary E attempts
to impersonate A, qubits sent from E cannot reproduce pure states with the
qubits stored in B’s storage device. Thus the Bell measurement by B detects
inevitable errors for E’s qubits. In (d,v), after B recognizes A correctly, B
resends half of the qubits of the Bell pairs in the right state to A. A then
stores them again in her smart card. In this protocol, there is no danger
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of clone leakage of A’s secret information from B, because B’s contracted
quantum state of qubits is the maximal entropy state. This is a remarkable
advantage over classical protocols. However, if A’s smart card is stolen by
E, E is able to impersonate A easily and the protocol becomes insecure.
Barnum 2 : The second protocol proposed by Barnum [10] uses catalyst
states. First, A and B share an entangled state |φ1〉 of two qubits. We
consider another state |φ2〉 of two qubits and assume that |φ2〉 is a state which
is never converted from |φ1〉 by local operations and classical communication
(LOCC). However, it is assumed to be possible that if A and B also share
a certain entangled state |χ〉, called a catalyst state, A and B are able to
transform |φ1〉 into |φ2〉 by LOCC. Under the transformation, |χ〉 remains
unchanged. An explicit setting of |φ1〉, |φ2〉 and |χ〉 can be seen in a standard
textbook [13]. Using a notion of catalyst states, Barnum proposed a quantum
authentication protocol as follows. In (d,i), A and B share a sequence of
qubit pairs in a catalyst state |χ〉. In (d,ii), A stores half of the qubits in a
quantum smart card and B keeps the other half in a quantum storage device.
In (d,iii), B generates a sequence of qubit pairs in |φ1〉 and sends half of the
pairs to A. In this step, A and B share a sequence of four-qubit composite
systems in a state |φ1〉 ⊗ |χ〉. They transform |φ1〉 ⊗ |χ〉 into |φ2〉 ⊗ |χ〉 by
LOCC. Then, A resends half of the qubit pairs in |φ2〉 to B. In (d,iv), B
performs a measurement which verifies whether the composite systems of
qubits sent from A and the qubits stored by B generated first in |φ1〉 are
really in |φ2〉. If B gets a positive result, B recognizes A. If not, B stops the
process. When E personates A, the transformation from |φ1〉 to |φ2〉 cannot
be achieved by E due to a lack of |χ〉. The advantage of this protocol is that
there is no need for A to send secret qubits in the catalyst state |χ〉 to B.
This reduces the risk that the secret key could be stolen in the transfer from
A to B. However, as for Barnum 1, if A’s smart card, which contains the
catalyst-state qubits, is stolen by E, E can impersonate A easily.
Guo et al.: In addition to the protocol of Barnum [10], a method of
quantum authentication by a different use of Bell states was proposed by
Guo et al. [9]. In (d,i), A and B determine a classical password as a sequence
of numbers composed of 1, 2, 3, 4. Each number is assigned to one of four
orthogonal Bell states of two qubits. This generates a sequence of Bell states
along the order of the classical password. In (d,ii), A stores half of the Bell
pairs in a quantum smart card. B keeps the other half in a quantum storage
device and also stores the classical password in an electronic database. In
(d,iii), A sends the qubits stored in the smart card to B. In (d,iv), B performs
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a Bell measurement of the qubits sent from A and the qubits stored by B so
as to read out the classical password. B checks whether the obtained results
agree with the password stored in the database. If the results are correct, B
recognizes A. If not, B stops the process. In (d,v), B resends half the Bell
pairs to A. In this protocol, similar to Barnum 1, the smart card does not
contain any information about the classical password because the contracted
quantum states of the qubits in the smart card are the maximal entropy
state. However, this protocol is insecure against card theft. Moreover, there
is a risk that copies of the classical password from B’s database could be
leaked.
In the next section, we propose a secure protocol, which is robust against
card theft. The protocol also prevents information leak from the verifier B.
3 Basic Protocol
In this section, we explain a basic protocol in order to outline the essence
of the idea behind our full, more secure protocol, which we will be detail in
section 5. The structure of the basic protocol is composed as follows. In
(c) of the previous section, the secret keys are a sequence of qubit pairs in
a Bell state. In (d,i), A and B meet and generate a sequence of qubit pairs
in a Bell state |+〉. In (d,ii), B puts half of the Bell pairs into a quantum
storage device, while A stores the other half in a quantum smart card. A also
generates a classical password composed of bit values 0 and 1 with the same
length of the above sequence of Bell pairs. The password is not revealed to
anybody, including B. A performs a unitary transformation on each qubit
in the smart card, dependent on the bit value of A’s password. When the
bit value is 0, the unitary transformation is the identity transformation I.
When the bit value is 1, the unitary transformation is R, which is not the
identity transformation. The action of R changes |+〉 into another Bell state
|ξ〉. The state |ξ〉 is not orthogonal to |+〉. In (d,iii), A encodes the classical
password by using two non-orthogonal quantum states |0〉 and |α〉 of a qubit.
The part of the password with bit values 0 is replaced by the state |0〉. The
other part with bit values 1 is replaced by |α〉. We call the sequence of these
qubits the quantum password. A sends to B both her quantum password
and the qubits stored in her smart card. In (d,iv), B combines the qubits
sent by A and the qubits that B keeps. The system becomes a sequence of
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composite three qubits which contains a qubit of A’s quantum password and
two qubits of Bell pairs as secret keys. B performs a unitary transformation
U on each three-qubit system. As seen below, if the input of U is legitimate,
all the states of the Bell-pair part become |+〉 independent of the bit values
of A’s password. If not, other Bell components orthogonal to |+〉 appear in
the output of U with nonzero probability and give an error. B performs a
measurement to check whether the state is really |+〉. If the result is positive,
B recognizes A. If not, B stops the process. In (d,v), B performs the inverse
transformation U−1 to each set of three qubits in the sequence and resends
only half of the Bell-pair part to A. The other half is entered again into B’s
storage device. The qubits of A’s quantum password are discarded by B so
that the information cannot be leaked.
In the following, we explain the protocol in more detail. First of all, we
specify the security levels of the environment. The region of A is assumed
to be secure against any attack by an adversary E. Meanwhile, E is allowed
to take classical information from the region of B, though E cannot get any
quantum media in or out the B’s region. This assumption about B’s region
implies for example that E can steal the data of the measurement results of
B, but is not able to bring entangled qubits into B’s region for teleportation
or to remove any quantum state of B. We also assume that a public channel
of classical communication is available between A and B in which radiowaves
with signals of A spread widely in open space towards B and no adversary
stops the communication. The channel is used for announcements to B of
the start of A’s protocol.
We now give a detailed explanation using a password example. The pro-
tocol is composed of nine steps, as follows.
(1) A and B meet and generate N qubit pairs in a Bell state |+〉. For
example, let us consider a case with N = 4. The state of the system is then
given by |+〉|+〉|+〉|+〉. A stores half of the qubits QA of the Bell pairs in
a quantum smart card. B keeps the other half QB of the Bell pairs in a
quantum storage device. The process is depicted in Fig. 1. Box A represents
A’s smart card and box B represents the quantum storage device. The circles
connected by wavy lines represent entangled qubits. (2) A generates an N -
bit classical password K composed of 0s and 1s, keeping it secret from B
and others. For instance, let us consider K = (0101). A performs a unitary
transformation R on the qubits of QA corresponding to the bit values 1 of K.
The action of R changes |+〉 into another Bell state |ξ〉. In the example, the
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state of QA and QB is transformed into |+〉|ξ〉|+〉|ξ〉. The process of (2) is
depicted in Fig. 2. (3) In authentication, A generates a quantum password
QK . The bit values 0 of K is encoded into a qubit state |0〉 and 1 of K is
encoded into a state |α〉 non-orthogonal to |0〉. In the example, the quantum
password is generated as QK = |0〉|α〉|0〉|α〉. (4) A sends QA and QK to
B through a quantum channel. (5) B unlocks QA and QB using a quantum
device UL with the quantum password QK . The device UL operates so as
to perform a unitary transformation U on the composite system of QK , QA
and QB. U does not change the input state |0〉|+〉 with bit values 0 of
K and transforms the input state |α〉|ξ〉 with bit values 1 of K into |c〉|+〉,
where |c〉 is a quantum state of a qubit of QK . Fig. 3 depicts the input state
for the N = 4 example and Fig. 4 shows the output state. (6) B checks
whether the output state of QA and QB is |+〉⊗N . This is done by a Bell
measurement of |+〉. If a positive result is obtained, B recognizes A. If not,
B stops the process. (7) B locks QA and QB by a quantum device L with
QK . The action of L is the inverse transformation of U . In the example,
the output state of L for QA and QB is given by |+〉|ξ〉|+〉|ξ〉. The output
state of L for QK is given by |0〉|α〉|0〉|α〉. (8) B breaks off QK and erases
the information so it cannot be stolen by others. (9) B returns QA to A and
A restores QA to the smart card.
We note that QA and QB cannot be decoded correctly by B without
the information of K or QK . Therefore, even if the smart card is stolen by
E, E cannot impersonate A without K. Thus, property (I) in section 1 is
achieved. Moreover, the contracted states of the qubits of QA become the
maximal entropy state:
ρmax =
I
2
.
Thus property (II) in section 1 is verified. Similarly, the contracted states of
QB also become the maximal entropy state. Therefore, the storage device of
B does not contain any information of K. It is also stressed that the only
information that B holds is QB. Hence E cannot steal useful information
about K from B’s storage device. This guarantees property (III). In step
(4), the information of K is encoded by two non-orthogonal states. Thus,
E cannot perfectly obtain QK by eavesdropping. By using an extension
which will be proposed in section 5, rapid detection of eavesdropping also
becomes possible and achieves property (IV). It is notable that there exists no
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entanglement between A’s quantum password QK and the composite system
of QA and QB. Therefore, QK is disposable in each round of the protocol.
Therefore property (V) is attained. B cannot get perfect information of
K in steps (5) and (6) because the quantum qubits accessible by B are all
non-orthogonal to each other.
In the following, we give explicit forms of the unitary transformation R
and U . Let us define four Bell states orthogonal to each other as follows:
|±〉 = 1√
2
[|0〉|0〉 ± |1〉|1〉] ,
|B±〉 = 1√
2
[|0〉|1〉 ± |1〉|0〉] ,
where |0〉 and |1〉 are two orthonormal states of a qubit. The first qubit is
stored by A and the second by B. The state |α〉, which is used when A’s
quantum password is generated, is given by
|α〉 = α|0〉+ β|1〉,
where α and β are real constants such that 0 ≤ α < 1 and β = √1− α2.
The unitary transformation R is defined as follows:
R|0〉 = eiδ|0〉,
R|1〉 = e−iδ|1〉,
where δ is a real parameter. For later convenience, we introduce two real
parameters ξ and η such that eiδ = ξ + iη, 0 ≤ ξ < 1 and η =
√
1− ξ2.
Acting on A’s qubit in |+〉 with R yields a new Bell state |ξ〉:
R⊗ I|+〉 = |ξ〉, (1)
where |ξ〉 is given by
|ξ〉 = ξ|+〉+ iη|−〉.
It is easy to check explicitly that |ξ〉 is a Bell state because the following
relations hold:
ρA = Tr
B
[|ξ〉〈ξ|] = I
2
,
ρB = Tr
A
[|ξ〉〈ξ|] = I
2
.
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Because |+〉 is also a Bell state, the following relations are also satisfied:
ρA = Tr
B
[|+〉〈+|] = I
2
,
ρB = Tr
A
[|+〉〈+] = I
2
.
Consequently no information of K can be extracted from only QA or QB.
Here it should be noted that a similar idea of imprinting information
into Bell states by a local operation has been proposed in [11]. However,
the authors treat only orthogonal Bell states. In contrast, non-orthogonal
Bell states play a crucial role in our protocol. Because |+〉 and |ξ〉 are not
orthogonal to each other, B cannot decode K perfectly by a measurement of
QA and QB.
The unitary transformation U is defined such that the following relations
are satisfied:
U |0〉|+〉 = |0〉|+〉, (2)
U |1〉|+〉 = β
d
ξ|1〉|+〉+ u11|0〉|−〉+ u21|1〉|−〉,
U |0〉|−〉 = −iαη
d
|1〉|+〉+ u12|0〉|−〉+ u22|1〉|−〉,
U |1〉|−〉 = −iβη
d
|1〉|+〉+ u13|0〉|−〉+ u23|1〉|−〉,
U |b〉|B±〉 = |b〉|B±〉,
where d is a real parameter given by d =
√
1− α2ξ2 and uij are complex
numbers satisfying uniary relations given by
|u11|2 + |u21|2 = 1− β
2ξ2
d2
,
|u12|2 + |u22|2 = 1− α
2η2
d2
,
|u13|2 + |u23|2 = 1− β
2η2
d2
,
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u11u
∗
13 + u21u
∗
23 = −i
β2ξη
d2
,
u12u
∗
13 + u22u
∗
23 = −
αβη2
d2
,
u11u
∗
12 + u21u
∗
22 = −i
αβξη
d2
.
U has the following properties. For bit values 0 of K, the input state |0〉|+〉
does not change at all under U operation as seen in Eq. (2). For bit values
1 of K, the input state |α〉|ξ〉 is transformed into
U |α〉|ξ〉 = |c〉|+〉, (3)
where |c〉 is a state defined by
|c〉 = αξ|0〉+ d|1〉. (4)
Eq. (3) can be directly verified from Eq.(4) and the inverse relation U−1|c〉|+〉 =
|α〉|ξ〉, which is derived from unitary relations such that
U−1|0〉|+〉 = |0〉|+〉,
U−1|1〉|+〉 = βξ
d
|1〉|+〉+ iαη
d
|0〉|−〉+ iβη
d
|1〉|−〉.
From Eq. (2) and Eq. (3), it is verified that entanglement between QK and
QA + QB is not generated before and after the operation of U and U
−1.
Therefore, purity of the state for QA+QB is preserved even if QK is discarded
by B after the authentication. This fact allows us to repeat the use of QA
stored in the smart card.
4 Security Analysis
In this section, we present security analysis of the above protocol. First,
we assume that E does not have A’s smart card and her password K. The
success probability ps of E per qubit to pass the authentication test by B
is evaluated as follows. Without access to K, E has to prepare a universal
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optimal state |ΨE〉⊗N of QK+QA as a forged quantum password and a forged
smart card. Without loss of generality, |ΨE〉 is written as
|ΨE〉 = Ψ00|0〉|0〉+Ψ01|0〉|1〉+Ψ10|1〉|0〉+Ψ11|1〉|1〉,
where Ψbb′ are complex coefficients satisfying the normalization condition of
the state. The first qubit corresponds to QK and the second to QA. Because
the forged input of E is not at all entangled with QB, the input state of QB
of U is given by IB/2, independent of the bit values of K. Hence ps is written
as
ps = 〈+|Tr
K
[
U
(
|ΨE〉〈ΨE| ⊗ IB
2
)
U †
]
|+〉
=
1
2
|〈0|〈+|U |ΨE〉|0〉|2 + 1
2
|〈0|〈+|U |ΨE〉|1〉|2
+
1
2
|〈1|〈+|U |ΨE〉|0〉|2 + 1
2
|〈1|〈+|U |ΨE〉|1〉|2 ,
where the trace is taken in terms of the state space of QK . Through straight-
forward manipulations, ps is evaluated as
ps =
1
4
|Ψ00|2 + 1
4
|Ψ01|2
+
1
4
∣∣∣∣βd e−iδΨ10 − i
αη
d
Ψ00
∣∣∣∣
2
+
1
4
∣∣∣∣βd eiδΨ11 + i
αη
d
Ψ01
∣∣∣∣
2
,
by use of the following unitary relations.
〈0|〈+|U = 〈0|〈+|,
〈1|〈+|U = βξ
d
〈1|〈+| − iαη
d
〈0|〈−| − iβη
d
〈1|〈−|.
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We can show that ps is bounded above by applying Schwartz inequalities as
follows:
ps ≤ 1
4
|Ψ00|2 + 1
4
|Ψ10|2
+
1
4
(|Ψ10|2 + |Ψ00|2)
+
1
4
(|Ψ11|2 + |Ψ01|2)
=
1
4
(|Ψ00|2 + |Ψ10|2)+ 1
4
≤ 1
2
.
Consequently, we get a lower bound of detection probability of E’s imper-
sonation as
p
(N)
E ≥ 1−
(
1
2
)N
.
Therefore, B is able to detect E with a high probability for a large N .
Next, we consider a case where E succeeds in stealing A’s card. However,
we assume that E does not know K. In this case, E must make a forged
quantum password. The optimal state for each qubit is denoted by ρE =
|KE〉〈KE|. Assuming K is randomly generated, the appearance probability
of each bit value of K is 1/2. For bit values 0 of K, the state of QA +QB is
|+〉. Thus, the detection probability of E per qubit is given by
pE0 = Tr
[
U (ρE ⊗ |+〉〈+|)U † (I − |+〉〈+|)
]
.
For bit values 1, the state is |ξ〉. Hence, the detection probability is written
as
pE1 = Tr
[
U (ρE ⊗ |ξ〉〈ξ|)U † (I − |+〉〈+|)
]
.
The average detection probability per qubit is given by
∆E =
1
2
pE0 +
1
2
pE1.
We parametrize ρE as
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ρE = r|0〉〈0|+ (1− r)|1〉〈1|+ (x+ iy) |0〉〈1|+ (x− iy) |1〉〈0|,
where
0 ≤ r ≤ 1, x2 + y2 = r(1− r).
The detection probability is then evaluated as
∆E =
1
2
1− ξ2
1− α2ξ2
[
1 + α2 − 2α2r − 2αβx] .
The minimum value of ∆E in terms of r and x is easily obtained as
pn = min∆E =
1
2
(
1− ξ2)
1− α2ξ2 (1− α) .
For instance, taking typical values of α and ξ as α = ξ = 1/2, the value of
pn is evaluated as pn = 1/5. It is noted that the total detection probability
of E is given by
p(N)n = 1− (1− pn)N .
Consequently, E can be detected with a high rate for a large N .
A comment should be made about man-in-the-middle attacks. If E is
able to secretly occupy classical and quantum channels between A and B and
perform any attack allowed by physics laws, E is able to steal all the quantum
states of A in the transfer through the channels. In order to impersonate A
after this round of the protocol, E must keep the stolen qubits. However,
we have assumed that E cannot prevent B from knowing the start of A’s
authentication protocol through a public channel. In order to avoid B quickly
noticing the impersonation, E has to send some forged qubits as QA and QK
to B. Then the identification test by B yields a wrong output and the man-
in-the-middle attack is easily noticed.
Though our protocol has many advantages, as detailed above, some sub-
tle loopholes exist. One of them may occur in step (4). Because of the
non-orthogonality of |0〉 and |α〉, perfect cloning of QK in the channel is
prohibited. However, it is possible for E to attempt an approximate cloning
of QK . Even though the cloning leaves a disturbance in the states of QK
received by B, the detection rate of eavesdropping is not large. If B fails to
detect E, E may next try to steal A’s smart card. Let us assume that E
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succeeds in obtaining the card. This card-steal attack with an approximate
clone of QK strongly decreases B’s probability of detecting impersonation.
Another loophole may occur in step (8). B discards A’s quantum password
QK after the authentication. If E infiltrates B’s region and secretly mea-
sures QK and accumulates the results, E can estimate K with high precision
after several rounds by A and B. This may lead to possible abuse of the
information by E. In the next section, we give an improved protocol robust
against these attacks, without loss of the advantages of the basic protocol.
5 Extended protocol
In this section, we present an extended protocol, which increases the detection
probability of eavesdropping in quantum channels and decreases the amount
of knowledge of K leaked in the discarding step of QK . Before A sends QK
to B, A generates a long sequence of two non-orthogonal states of qubits like
the BB84 quantum key distribution [14] and uses them as decoys to detect
eavesdropping. In order to suppress the leakage of information about K,
a one-time-pad method is adopted when A generates a quantum password.
The extended protocol is composed of 14 steps as follows.
(1) A and B meet and generate N qubit pairs in a Bell state |+〉. A
stores half of the Bell pairs QA in a quantum smart card. B keeps the other
half QB in a quantum storage device. (2) A generates an N -bit classical
password K composed of 0s and 1s and keeps it secret from B and others.
A performs R for QA qubits corresponding to bit values 1 of K. (3) In
authentication, the lock process is reversed using K. A performs R−1 for QA
qubits corresponding to bit values 1 of K. (4) A generates N -bit pseudo-
random numbers K˜. K˜ is used as a one-time-pad password in the transfer of
A’s qubits. A performs R for QA corresponding to bit values 1 of K˜. (5) A
generates a quantum password QK˜ . The bit values 0 of K˜ are encoded into
a qubit state |0〉 and bit values 1 of K˜ into |α〉. (6) A generates a sequence
of ND pseudo-random numbers KD composed of 2, 3, 4, 5. KD is quantum
mechanically encoded using four quantum states |0〉, |1〉 and
14
|0×〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉) ,
|1×〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉) .
The number 2 in KD is replaced by |0〉, 3 by |1〉, 4 by |0×〉 and 5 by |1×〉.
We call the sequence of qubits QD. (7) A makes QK˜ randomly slip into QD
and sends QA and QK˜ + QD to B. (8) After they are received by B, A
announces to B the positions of the qubits of QD and the value of KD. B
then separates QD from QK˜ . B measures QD in the basis of {|0〉, |1〉} if the
value of KD is 2 or 3 and in the basis of {|0×〉, |1×〉} if the value of KD is 4
or 5. If the results are consistent with KD, B makes a judgement that there
is no eavesdropping. If it is judged that eavesdropping may have occurred, B
stops the process. (9) B unlocks QA and QB by the unitary transformation
U with the password QK˜ . U does not change the input state |0〉|+〉 with bit
value 0 of K˜ and transforms the input state |α〉|ξ〉 with bit value 1 of K˜ into
|c〉|+〉. (10) B checks whether the output state of QA +QB is |+〉⊗N . If the
result is positive, B recognizes A. If not, B stops the process. (11) B locks
QA and QB by U
−1 with QK˜ . (12) B discards QK˜ . (13) B returns QA to A
and A restores QA to the smart card. (14) A performs R
−1 to the qubits of
QA corresponding to bit values 1 of K˜ to make the state of QA + QB to be
|+〉⊗N . Then, A locks QA + QB by the original password K. A performs R
on the qubits of QA corresponding to bit values 1 of K.
The one-time-pad password method in step (4) prevents E from stealing
the information of the original password K when the quantum password is
discarded by B. Step (8) of the protocol also prevents approximate cloning
attacks by E eavesdropping by taking a largeND. A detailed security analysis
will be reported elsewhere.
It is expected that the protocol will protect the basic infrastructure of
the information-based society if a quantum smart card is devised which can
store quantum information for a long period.
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Figure Captions
Fig. 1: In the basic protocol, A and B meet and share Bell pairs. The
case with K = (0101) is depicted. The state of the system is given by
|+〉|+〉|+〉|+〉. A stores half of the Bell pairs QA in a quantum smart card.
B keeps the other half QB in a quantum storage device. Box A indicates
the smart card and box B indicates the quantum storage device. The circles
connected by wavy lines represent entangled qubits.
Fig. 2: A generates a classical password K composed of 0s and 1s and
keeps it secret, even from B. The case with K = (0101) is depicted. A
performs a unitary transformation R on the qubits of QA corresponding to
bit values 1 of K. The action of R changes |+〉 into another Bell state |ξ〉.
In this example, the state of QA and QB is given by |+〉|ξ〉|+〉|ξ〉.
Fig. 3: B unlocks QA and QB using a quantum device UL with the pass-
word QK . The device UL operates so as to perform a unitary transformation
U on the composite system of QK , QA and QB. The input state is depicted
for the example.
Fig. 4: The output state of UL is depicted.
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